Migrating to the cloud simplifies hardware management but introduces a different set of security responsibilities. Unlike an on-premise setup where you control the entire physical and network stack, in the cloud, security is a partnership between you and the provider. This is formally known as the Shared Responsibility Model. The provider is responsible for the security of the cloud (the physical data centers, hardware, and core networking), while you are responsible for security in the cloud (your data, configurations, access policies, and application code).
Neglecting your side of this partnership can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access to expensive GPU resources, or model theft. Building a secure AI environment requires a defense-in-depth strategy, layering controls across identity, networking, and data.
The first line of defense is controlling who can do what. Every major cloud provider has an Identity and Access Management (IAM) service (e.g., AWS IAM, Google Cloud IAM, Azure Active Directory). The foundational principle here is the Principle of Least Privilege: grant only the permissions necessary to perform a task.
Avoid using your root or administrator account for daily tasks. Instead, create specific IAM roles and users with tailored policies. For AI workloads, a common pattern is to create roles for different functions:
Here is a simplified example of an IAM policy in JSON format that allows a training instance to access a specific S3 bucket:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"s3:GetObject",
"s3:ListBucket"
],
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ai-datasets",
"arn:aws:s3:::my-ai-datasets/*"
]
},
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "s3:PutObject",
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-model-artifacts/*"
}
]
}
This policy is attached to an IAM Role, which is then assigned to the cloud instance. The application running on the instance automatically acquires these permissions without needing to handle any secret keys.
Your AI infrastructure should not be fully exposed to the public internet. Use the Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) services to create a logically isolated section of the cloud. Within a VPC, you can define public and private subnets.
To control traffic flow to and from your instances, you use firewall rules. In AWS these are called Security Groups, and in GCP and Azure, they are simply Firewall Rules. These are stateful firewalls that operate at the instance level. For example, you can configure a security group for your training instances that only allows inbound SSH traffic (port 22) from your bastion host's security group, and no other inbound traffic at all.
A typical secure network architecture. The Engineer can only access the private training instance by first connecting to the bastion host in the public subnet. The training instance accesses data from S3 using a secure IAM role, not over the public internet.
Your datasets and trained models are valuable intellectual property. Protecting them is non-negotiable.
All data sent between your components should be encrypted. This means using TLS (often referred to as SSL) for all connections. When your training instance pulls data from an object storage service like Amazon S3 or Google Cloud Storage, ensure you are connecting to the HTTPS endpoint. This prevents eavesdropping on the network.
Data stored in object storage or on virtual machine disks should also be encrypted. Most cloud providers enable server-side encryption by default for their object storage services. This means the provider manages the encryption keys and automatically encrypts your data when it's written and decrypts it when it's accessed (assuming you have the right IAM permissions). For enhanced security or compliance needs, you can use Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK), where you control the cryptographic keys via a service like AWS KMS or Google Cloud KMS. This gives you the power to revoke access to the data at the key level.
Never hardcode sensitive information like API keys, database passwords, or authentication tokens in your code or configuration files. This is a common source of security breaches. Instead, use a dedicated secrets management service:
Your application code can be given an IAM role that allows it to fetch these secrets at runtime. This practice decouples secrets from your codebase, allows for easy rotation of credentials, and provides a clear audit trail of who accessed which secret and when. For example, a Flask application serving a model can fetch its database password from Secrets Manager upon startup instead of reading it from a local file.
Was this section helpful?
© 2026 ApX Machine LearningAI Ethics & Transparency•